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Abstract
This paper puts a new light on secure data storage inside distributed
systems, such as data centers composed of multiple independent storage
servers or multi-cloud architectures. Specifically, it revisits computational
secret sharing based on symmetric encryption in a situation where the
encryption key is exposed to an attacker. It comes with several contribu-
tions:
First, it defines a security model for encryption schemes, where we
ask for additional resilience against exposure of the encryption key. Pre-
cisely we ask for (1) indistinguishability of plaintexts under full ciphertext
knowledge, (2) indistinguishability for an adversary who learns: the en-
cryption key, plus all but one share of the ciphertext. (2) relaxes the
”all-or-nothing” (AONT) property to a more realistic secret sharing set-
ting, where the ciphertext is transformed into a constant number of shares
(typically storage locations), such that the adversary can’t access one of
them. (1) asks that, unless the user’s key is disclosed, noone else (includ-
ing the cloud provider) than the user can retrieve information about the
plaintext.
Second, it introduces a new computationally secure encryption-then-
sharing scheme, that protects the data in the previously defined attacker
model. It consists in standard data encryption followed by a linear trans-
formation of the ciphertext, then its fragmentation into shares, along with
secret sharing of the randomness used for encryption. The computational
overhead in addition to data encryption is reduced by half with respect
to state of the art. The storage overhead is negligible for large data (one
additional ciphertext block by share). Performance results confirm the
complexity analysis.
Third, it provides for the first time cryptographic proofs –and dis-
cusses the security analysis of a previous scheme– in this context of key
exposure. It emphasizes that the security of our scheme relies only on a
simple cryptanalysis resilience assumption for blockciphers in public key
mode: indistinguishability from random, of the sequence of differentials
of a random value. By contrast, virtually all existing schemes rely on
the unimplementable models of random oracle (RO) or of Shannon’s ideal
blockcipher —which is furthermore recently threatened for AES.
Fourth, it provides an alternative scheme with no linear overhead, but
relying on the more theoretical random permutation model (RPM). It
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concretely consists in encrypting with sponge functions in duplex mode
then, as before, secret-sharing the randomness.
Keywords— all-or-nothing, protection against key exposure, data
fragmentation, data dispersal, computational secret sharing.
1 Introduction
Symmetric encryption is an efficient way of protecting data at rest unless the
encryption key is revealed and thus the data becomes vulnerable to all attackers
able to access the storage site. The issue of the key exposure cannot be ignored
as it is a real threat that may have several origins. First, it may be the result
of bad key generation, for instance because of the use of hard-coded keys or
backdoors in the key generation software [12, 18]. Second, the key may be
revealed because of its bad management. Indeed, secure key management may
be to costly or simply a burden for a mere user, especially in a long-term storage
context. Moreover, a popular scenario for cloud storage outsourcing implies
sharing the outsourced resource with multiple users and consequently sharing
with them the encryption key [1]. The risk of key exposure grows then with time
and the number of users as it suffices that one of the users neglects precautions
for the secure key management. Third, the key length may be not sufficient
for powerful adversaries with enough computational power. Last but not least,
an encryption key may be simply stolen or acquired as the result of bribery or
coercion.
In distributed storage systems a way of reinforcing data confidentiality con-
sists in secret sharing the data into multiple shares, all of which are mandatory
for data reconstruction. Once the shares are dispersed over independent storage
locations, the information is protected against adversaries unable to compromise
all of the storage sites. Such data transformation into shares makes use of the
all-or-nothing (AON) encryption that creates dependencies inside the ciphertext
so its partial decryption becomes infeasible. This additional protection comes
usually at a performance costs as it requires more than one round of encryption.
Therefore, it did not find application inside commercial storage systems. The
recently introduced Bastion scheme [18] proposes to reduce the complexity of
AON to a single encryption round followed by a linear transform.
Our work comes as a complement to more classic Key Management Infras-
tructure [2], since we believe that the risk of key exposure is impossible to com-
pletely eradicate. We thoroughly revisit computational secret sharing aiming at
data protection against the exposure of the cryptographic key. The proposed
security model represents a situation where the secret shared and dispersed data
is protected against an adversary able to compromise all but one storage sites
(and therefore acquire all but one shares). This model differs from the classi-
cal AONT one, which so far focused on the amount of the ciphertext blocks
acquired by an attacker and not on the amounts of shares. More precisely, we
ask for two properties (1) ciphertext indistinguishability under knowledge of all
the shares (but not of the key) 1, (2) ciphertext indistinguishability for an ad-
versary who learns but plus all but one shares of the ciphertext 2. We analyze
1This property prevents a storage provider not knowing the encryption key from learning
any information about the stored data.
2This property prevents an external attacker that is unable to compromise all the storage
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the relevant works in function of these two security properties, as well as we
point out under which hypotheses these properties are verified. We introduce
then an efficient scheme achieving both properties, which is faster —and secure
under lighter assumptions— than all previously known solutions based on the
demanding all-or-nothing techniques.
We evidence that, in the particular situation of key exposure, it is not enough
to rely on a blockcipher which is a mere keyed pseudorandom permutation. We
single out a sufficient assumption to prove security of the previous scheme [18],
also relying on data encryption and linear transformation, which certainly holds
under the ideal blockcipher model (see [6]), in which the authors cast their
scheme. Relying on such strong ideal hypotheses seems unavoidable in AONT-
based techniques: see 3.4. In 6.4 we recall why this model is unimplementable
and, very recently, has been evidenced inappropriate in the context of the AES
encryption [24, 25, 8]. By contrast, the security of our scheme relies only on a
simple cryptanalysis resilience hypothesis: indistinguishability of the sequence
of differentials of a fixed (hidden) random value, from a random string.
Outline In Section 2 we present data structures and notations used during
descriptions. In Section 3, we present related works as well as point out their
limitations. In Section 4, we introduce the new security model. In Section 5,
we describe our new fast scheme for data protection against key exposure. In
Section 6, we not only present the security proof for our proposal but also
revisit the security analysis for a recent relevant scheme. As an alternative,
in 7 we sketch out a scheme based on Keccak in Duplex mode with no linear
transformation at all, but relying on the more theoretical random permutation
model (RPM). In Section 8 we present the comparison between our proposal
and the state-of-the art techniques.
2 Main Data Structures and Notations
We identify the following basic data structures that mostly correspond to the
classical concepts concerning block cipher encryption and computational secret
sharing scheme:
• Plaintext/Ciphertext block (Pi/Ci): a sequence of bits of size |B|
corresponding to the classical concept of block inside of the input/output
of a block cipher [17].
• Plaintext (−−−−−→PLAIN ): initial data, is composed of c− 1 blocks Pi.
• Ciphertext −−−−→CIPH = EK(−−−−−→PLAIN ): plaintext encrypted with a keyed
encryption scheme EK using a key K of keysize |K| into c = c− 1 + 1
ciphertext blocks. Thus is of total bitsize |−−−−→CIPH| = c|B|.
• Transformed ciphertext (−−−−→CIPH ′): the ciphertext −−−−→CIPH after being
transformed using a post-processing blockwise linear transform φ, of ma-
trix size (here) (c− 1)× c.
• Fragment (Fi): −−−−→CIPH ′ is fragmented into n fragments typically com-
posed of ∼ cn blocks (when data is fragmented in an uniform way).
locations.
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• Share (Si): the total data stored in each of the n storage places. It
may be composed just of a fragment of the ciphertext or of a fragment
appended additional information.
3 Related Work
This section presents state-of-the-art methods that aim at reinforcing data con-
fidentiality using data transformation into a set of shares and dispersal of these
shares over a set of different storage sites. For each method we point out which
of the two interesting security properties (1) and/or (2) it verifies.
3.1 Perfect secret sharing (PSS)
Perfect secret sharing [7, 26] with threshold m− 1 transforms data into a set of
n shares, m of which are needed for data reconstruction. Strictly less than m
shares provide no information whatsoever about the initial data, so the infor-
mation is protected against adversaries unable to collect the required threshold
of m shares. Shamir’s perfect secret sharing scheme (PSS) [7, 26] is information
theoretically secure. This optimal security comes at the cost of a n-fold increase
in the volume of the data to be stored as each of the shares is of the size of
the data itself. PSS verifies (2), if the pseudo-random material used during the
secret sharing was correctly generated.
3.2 The family of all-or-nothing schemes
The main idea behind an all-or-nothing (AON) encryption type is to make
the ciphertext decryptable only when complete. This security property can
be achieved using a pre- or post-processing of encrypted data denoted as an
all-or-nothing transform (AONT).
3.2.1 Rivest’s AONT proposal and Boyko’s formalization
Rivest’s [23] introduced the first known AONT, which is meant to be a pre-
processing step applied before data encryption. During this AONT, input data
is encrypted into ciphertext
−−−−→
CIPH = C1, . . . , Cc using a first random key K1. A
hash of the encrypted data is then computed, XOR-ed with K1, and appended
as the last block of the ciphertext Cc+1 = Hash(
−−−−→
CIPH) + K1. After such
data transform, it is not possible to obtain the right hash, and consequently the
encryption key, without possessing the whole ciphertext. However, an attacker
knowing K1 can obviously decrypt a part of the ciphertext in her possession.
Therefore, Rivest suggests to re-encrypt the transformed data one more time
with a different encryption key K2. The data will be then protect against the
exposure of the first K1 or second key K2 (but not both of them) unless the
whole ciphertext is revealed.
Boyko formalized later the all-or-nothing transform [9, Definition 2]. The
numerous subsequent variants of AONT are encompassed by the following loose
definition: it consists of a randomized map AONT , which maps an input
−→
X
of fixed size to an output
−→
Y of fixed size y bits and such that a polynomial
adversary A has negligible advantage in the following indistinguishability game,
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where
−→
L is a set of missing bit positions in
−→
Y . ”Negligible” is to be understood
with respect to the security parameters: length of a certain symmetric key ks
(underlying to AONT ) and number of missing bits |−→L |.
• A has access to AONT and is given −→L (or possibly adaptively chooses−→
L ). She outputs two plaintexts
−→
X 0 and
−→
X 1.
• A is given
−−−−−−−−→
AONT (
−→
X b), with bit positions
−→
L missing, and b ∈ {0, 1} is a
random index unknown to the adversary.
• To win the game A has to guess b.
Rivest’s AON scheme consists in an AONT according to the Boyko’s defini-
tion, followed by a second encryption. However, it is supposed that A has not
access to both of the encryption keys: the K1 used during the AONT and K2
used during after. Therefore, the protection against key exposure is somehow
achieved by multiplying encryption layers.
Performance of the Rivest’s AON scheme is another issue. Two encryption
rounds and one hash makes the processing much slower than just data encryp-
tion. Desai proposed a faster modification of the Rivest’s scheme that replaces
the hash of the data with a sum of all of the ciphertext blocks but still requires
the two encryption rounds [15]. Although the complete AON encryption as pro-
posed by Rivest was too impractical to be implemented in commercial storage
systems, a modification of solely the AONT transform, the AONT-RS [22], is
applied inside the IBM Cloud Object Storage 3.
AON encryption as proposed by Rivest’s, Desai’s, or Boyko’s, addresses
both of the security properties, (1) and (2). Nevertheless, the (2) property is
not verified in a situation when the first encryption key K1 (the one hidden in
the data for AONT) is also revealed, e.g. due to a bad generation.
3.2.2 Stinson’s linear all-or-nothing transform and the Bastion scheme
Stinson [27] formalized a linear all-or-nothing transform as an invertible matrix
Mat of size n × n, that maps an ”unknown” input vector −→X of length x to a
”partially known” output vector
−→
Y , such that for each index i, and every missing
coordinate j, an attacker who manages to learn all coordinates of
−→
Y but yj will
learn no more information on xi than what he knew a priori. However, we would
like to emphasize that the standalone property of a linear AONT is not enough
to obtain a cryptosystem. Indeed, as emphasized by Rivest’s student Boyko in
[9] 4, an attacker may still learn correlations between unknown coordinates xi,
potentially ruining the ind-CPA security of the ciphertext.
Recently introduced Bastion scheme [18] builds on a variant of Stinson’s
linear AONT. The plaintext is first encrypted, then the ciphertext is transformed
using a square matrix MatBastion such that: (i) all diagonal elements are set to
0, and (ii) remaining off-diagonal elements are set to 1. As a result, each block
3https://www.ibm.com/cloud/object-storage. Previously: Cleversafe.
4”However, the linear constructions of Stinson would definitely not be secure in that model,
since it is easy to come up with linear relations among the elements of
−→
X by looking at just a
few elements of ϕ(
−→
X ) (in fact, since ϕ(
−→
X ) is linear and deterministic, every output of ϕ(
−→
X )
gives a linear relation on elements of
−→
X”
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of the ciphertext is XOR-ed with all other ciphertext blocks. The transformed
ciphertext is then protected against key exposure unless all but two ciphertext
blocks are exposed (one more block than in the case of Stinson’s AONT). The
advantage of Bastion’s approach is that they require only a single encryption
round and thus is much faster than the Rivest’s initial proposal. They claim to
address both of the security properties, (1) and (2), in the strong sense of only
two missing blocks. However at the cost of making the strong Shannon’s ideal
blockcipher hypothesis, as we will analyse and discuss in6.2.
3.3 Computational secret sharing (CSS)
A CSS essentially differs from AONT by asking that the adversary ignores a
fixed percentage of the stored data (a share), instead than a fixed amount of
bits. CSS scheme encrypt a plaintext of size |−−−−−→PLAIN | into n shares of size
close to |
−−−−−→
PLAIN |
n (contrary to PSS which is space inefficient), such that an
adversary knowing all but one shares (in the case of threshold n − 1) learns
no information about the plaintext, in the sense of indistinguishability. In the
Krawczyk’s Secret Sharing Made Short [20], a CSS scheme was introduced where
the encrypted plaintext is fragmented into n fragments and the encryption key
is split into n key shares using a PSS scheme. A share then contains a fragment
of the ciphertext together with a share of the key.
Krawczyk’s CSS addresses the (2) security property as long as the key used
to encrypt the data was generated in a correct way: an attacker learns no
information about the data unless collecting the totality of the shares. It does
not however address the property (1), as once all the shares are gathered, the
adversary can reconstruct everything.
3.4 The additional cost of AONT vs CSS in terms of se-
curity hypotheses
Krawczyk’s CSS is proven secure under the light assumption that the encryption
is indistinguishable under chosen plaintexts attacks [20, Theorem 3]. By con-
trast, Boyko [9, Theorem 1] assumes a public random oracle O as a primitive.
In Desai [15, Theorem 2], security is proven in the ideal blockcipher model. Let
us finally review Rivest’s [23] AONT, which shows up as a pre-processing step in
his AON scheme (applied before data encryption). This AONT was singled out
in [22], however Chen, Laing and Martin evidenced information leakage5, then
fixed it in the random oracle model: [11, Theorem 1]. See 6.4 for a discussion
on the practical limits of these strong ideal models.
4 Relaxing Security Model
Let us evacuate the indistinguishability requirement (1), which is in the classical
scenario where the adversary ignores the key: we exactly ask for indistinguisha-
bility under chosen plaintexts (ind-CPA) in the sense of [19, p. 74].
5Apparently only for plaintexts of short size, which is not our use-case
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4.1 (n− 1) Shares Access under Key Exposure
As for the security requirement (2), we base ourselves on the adaptation of the
ind-CPA property to the key exposure scenario presented in [18]. By contrast to
[18], we remove the ideal blockcipher requirement, and also relax the adversary’s
power: she is now able to access all but one shares, instead of all but λ ciphertext
blocks. This relaxation fits more a realistic use case where the dispersal obstacle
lies in the number of shares and not blocks acquired by an attacker; An attacker
that was able to compromise a storage site was most probably also able to gather
all of the ciphertext blocks stored at this site 6.
Let us consider a keyed blockcipher BC that maps blocks to blocks, and let
us fix any key K that we give to the adversary. A relaxed variant, where the
adversary doesn’t influence the key, could be: ”any correctly generated key”.
Thus BC can from now on be considered as a public permutation. We consider
a public randomized invertible transformation SBC that uses BC as a primitive.
SBC maps a plaintext to n shares:
(1) SBC : (−−−−−→PLAIN , r) −→ S1, . . . , Sn.
where r ∈ R is the random component of the input of S (e.g. the initialization
vector for CTR mode, or sponge header [4]) Here we are just saying that our
function uses an extra variable r ∈ R as input, leaving to Hypothesis 1 below
the assumption on how r should be generated7
Our polynomial adversary A has access at any time (A is ”adaptive”) to an
oracle which performs BC (and its inverse BC−1) on any block of A’s choice, as
well as performs SSAKEBC (or its inverse) on any plaintext (or set of n shares)
of A’s choice. Of course A has not access to the random parameter r ∈ R used
by the challenging oracle O to prepare the game’s challenge.
Here is the (n − 1) shares - Shares Access under Key Exposure (SAKE)
security game between A and the challenging oracle O, that defines ind-CPA
security in this context. We ask that the following game holds for all (correctly
generated) key K:
1. A outputs to O a pair of plaintexts −−−−−→PLAIN 0 and −−−−−→PLAIN 1 of the same
length.
2. O chooses a bit b ∈ 0, 1.
3. O generates a random input r (under Hypothesis 1 below) and performs
the transformation S(−−−−−→PLAIN b, r) that gives n shares S(b)1 , . . . , S(b)n .
4. A chooses n− 1 indices of shares she wants and O gives them to A.
5. A outputs to O a bit b′.
6. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
In the former case, we say that A succeeds.
If the adversary has no nonnegligible advantage in this game, with respect
to the length of one block as security parameter, then we say that the scheme
is (n− 1) SAKE secure.
6A rare exception to this scenario would be in the case of a memory leak attack
7A very strong assumption could be that r is the output of a random beacon (see [21, 7],
which is slightly less demanding than a random oracle)
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5 SSAKE : Secret Sharing Against Key Exposure
In this section we introduce a new computational secret sharing scheme: SSAKE,
that protects data in both the considered attacker models (1) and (2).
We consider a keyed blockcipher BC, which is a function operating on blocks
of size |B| bits (typically 128) and which outputs |B| bits. We note + or ⊕ the
XOR operation between two blocs : i.e. the sum of binary vectors in F
|B|
2 . We
will sometimes add a block with a number i (typically the counter of CTR mode).
By this abuse of notation we simply mean the binary writing of the number i,
seen as a vector in F
|B|
2 . We make the following computational assumption:
Hypothesis 1 (Indistinguishability of differentials of a random value). Let K
be any key (relaxed variant: ”any correctly generated key”), and
−→
∆ = 1, 2, . . . , c
be a fixed sequence of numbers, then any polynomial adversary A has negligible
advantage in the following game (with regards to security parameter |K|) against
the challenging oracle O:
1. A is given K and, throughout, has oracle access to BC := BCK and
BC−1.
2. O generates r ← {0, 1}|B| uniformly at random (stronger variant: ”gen-
erates efficiently” r)8, and computes the vector of ”differentials”
(2)−−−−→
Diffr := BC(r)+BC(r+1), BC(r)+BC(r+2), . . . , BC(r)+BC(r+c−1)
3. O gives to A both the sequence −−−−→Diffr and a truly uniform random sequence−−−→
rand or same length. A must guess which one is −−−−→Diffr.
In particular, the hypothesis implies that the ”slopes” of BCK in many
directions from r do not give any information on r. This kind of computational
property of indistinguishability with a random sequence can be found in the
related works of [4, Theorem 1], [15, Definition 4] or [10, Definition 1], see also
the minimal requirement for counter mode in [16]. On the cryptanalysis side,
see e.g. the studies of differential patterns of public permutations in 9 and 10.
The SSAKE algorithm starts with plaintext
−−−−−→
PLAIN = P1, . . . , Pc−1 en-
cryption using blockcipher BC in Counter Mode CTR (we chose this mode
instead of CBC for parallelizability, and simplicity of Hypothesis 1). This re-
sults in a ciphertext
−−−−→
CIPH = C0, . . . , Cc−1, composed of c− 1 blocks. For the
sake of completeness, let us just remind that such encryption consists to one-
time pad the vector [0,
−−−−−→
PLAIN ] ∈ (F|B|2 )c (
−−−−−→
PLAIN concatenated with zero
block appended) with the following vector (which is not pseudorandom: see 6.2
and appendix .1):
(3) [BC(IV ), BC(IV + 1), . . . , BC(IV + c− 1)] ∈ (F |B|2 )c
8At least the efficient generation of r should not depend solely on the plaintext nor the
key (so not a hash of the ciphertext, as in AONT-RS [11, 3]), since they are known/chosen
by the adversary. Anyway here, as in the PSS scheme or any standard encryption scheme, we
are only asking for local generation of randomness. This is a less demanding hypothesis than
[9, 11]’s random oracle, which, by contrast, is a public function (see e.g. [21, 7]) of arbitrary
long input ([13]).
9https://keccak.team/third_party.html
10https://gimli.cr.yp.to/papers.html
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generated from a random seed IV := r ← {0, 1}|B|: the initialization vector,
selected as in Hypothesis 1. The output of this operation is the ciphertext 11
(4)
−−−−→
CIPH = [C0, . . . , Cc−1] ∈ (F|B|2 )c
of c = c− 1 + 1 blocks.
A noninvertible linear transform composed is then applied to the ciphertext−−−−→
CIPH transforming it into
−−−−→
CIPH ′ of length c − 1: each ciphertext block i,
i ≥ 2, is XOR-ed with its predecessor C ′i := Ci + Ci−1. Aditionally, the initial-
ization vector block IV is split using a perfect secret sharing scheme (PSS) with
adversary threshold n− 1 into n shares IV 1, . . . , IV n: for example, an additive
secret sharing. So the original ciphertext
−−−−→
CIPH can be recovered from both−−−−→
CIPH ′ and the shared IV .
The linear transformation of the
−−−−→
CIPH into
−−−−→
CIPH ′ can be shown as right
multiplication by the following noninvertible binary matrix MatSSAKE :
(5)
−−−−→
CIPH ′ :=
−−−−→
CIPH ·

1 0 0 0 . 0
1 1 0 0 . 0
0 1 1 0 . 0
0 0 1 1 . 0
0 0 0 1 . 0
. . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . 1

Transformed ciphertext
−−−−→
CIPH ′ is split into n fragments. This can be done
in various ways. The simplest way is to just create the fragments from large
chunks of consecutive
−−−−→
CIPH ′ blocs. Consecutive blocks can be also dispersed
over different fragments - this would reveal less information to an attacker that
somehow managed to obtain the initialization vector but has no knowledge
about the plaintext.
1: function SSAKE(PLAIN, n)
2: Encrypt
−−−−−→
PLAIN into
−−−−→
CIPH = [C0, . . . , Cc−1] of c blocks
3: Linear transform:
4: for each i = 1, . . . , c− 1 do
5: Compute C ′i = Ci−1 + Ci
6: Fragment
−−−−→
CIPH ′ := [C ′1, . . . , C
′
c−1] into n fragments F1, . . . , Fn
7: PSS IV into shares: PSS(IV ) = IV 1, . . . , IV n
8: for each i = 1, . . . , n do
9: Concatenate Fi and IVi to obtain a final share: Si = IV i||Fi
Figure 1: Pseudo-code of the SSAKE algorithm.
We do not present the data reconstruction from the shares as it is a direct
inverse of the SSAKE processing.
11We ask for the first block of ciphertext to be C0 = BC(IV ), in order to be in the setting of
Hypothesis 1. We could instead have stuck with the classical choice C0 := IV , and modified
Hypothesis 1 accordingly. Our choice doesn’t anyway slow down decryption, since IV is
shared.
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6 Security Analysis
6.1 Security proof of SSAKE under computational Hy-
pothesis 1
Theorem 1. Under Hypothesis 1, SSAKE satisfies (1): ind-CPA if key is
unknown and (2): (n− 1)-SAKE security (4.1) if the key is known.
Proof. (1) is the classical ind-CPA security of CTR mode as e.g. in [19, Theorem
3.30]. As for (2), let us consider an adversary A playing the SAKE game of 4.1,
who has chosen two plaintext
−−−−−→
PLAIN (b) b = 0, 1, and is given n − 1 shares
under SSAKE of one of them. Her view consists in n− 1 shares of the IV and
n − 1 fragments of −−−−→CIPH’. First, one can reason as if A did not receive the
n− 1 shares of IV under the PSS12
Then, consider a more advantageous Game2 where the A is given all of
(6)
−−−−→
CIPH ′ :=
−−−−→
CIPH ·MatSSAKE
Since she has strictly more information in this game, her guessing advantage is
bigger.
Consider finally Game3, where the adversary is instead given
−−−−→
CIPH”, ob-
tained from
−−−−→
CIPH ′ with the following successive operations (that one can also
see as arising from elementary columns operations on MatSSAKE):
C ′i ←− C ′i−1 for i = 2 . . . c− 1 , that is:(7)
−−−−→
CIPH” : =
−−−−→
CIPH ·

1 1 1 1 . 1
1 0 0 0 . 0
0 1 0 0 . 0
0 0 1 0 . 0
0 0 0 1 . 0
. . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . 1
(8)
Where it is clear that, since the operations are reversible, the adversary
in Game3 can recover the view of adversary in Game2 so has larger (actually
equal) advantage. But with the notations of Hypothesis 1, an adversary in
Game3 receives exactly
−−−−−→
DiffIV +
(
P
(b)
1 , . . . , P
(b)
c−1
)
so whatever the value of the bit b, she has negligible advantage in distinguish-
ing what she receives from random, by Hypothesis 1. So she can’t a fortiori
distinguish between the two possibilities.
6.2 Revisiting the security analysis of Bastion: the issue
of pseudorandomness
Firstly, let us briefly recapitulate the template of the proof of the ind-CPA
security for CTR mode —that the paper [18] follows for their ”proof sketch
12Either because these shares are random values in any case, as can be seen e.g. from
Shamir’s scheme, or more formally, because a PSS is universally composable (see [14, chap 4])
so can be formally replaced in any protocol by a black box that gives no information to an
adversary accessing up to n− 1 shares.
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3”— following e.g. [19, theorem 3.32]. (I) Consider two variants of the ind-CPA
CAKE game as defined in [18, 3.2]. The first one is where A plays the game
against an oracle O which uses a pseudo-random blockcipher with a random
key, let us note CTR(|B|)AΠ the output of this game. In the second variant of
the game, O replaces the blockcipher by a perfectly random permutation BC ,
and we note CTR(|B|)A
Π˜
the output of this game. The goal is then to show, as
in [19, formula 3.12] , that the two outputs are statistically the same, i.e. that
the adversary will have the same behavior against the two kinds of oracles. (II)
Show that A has negligible advantage in the second game ([19, formula 3.13] ).
But in the CAKE game, the permutation BC, is fixed and publicly known.
So, contrary to what is claimed in loc. cit. at the end of the proof sketch 2, the
output of the CTR is not pseudorandom13 To examplify the problem, we show
in appendix .1 that, when the key of the blockcipher is known, then this is not
the case even from the point of view of an adversary who knows only any two
output blocks of CTR.
6.3 Minimal sufficient hypotheses for the security of Bas-
tion
As we just saw, public knowledge of the inverse BC−1 makes the output of
CTR appear nonrandom. Nevertheless, we prove in Appendix .2 the following
Proposition 1, which states that the security of Bastion holds under a certain
pseudorandomness hypothesis. This condition could certainly hold in the Shan-
non’s ideal blockcipher model, in which the authors of [18] initially cast their
scheme.
Unlike the notations of [18], we adopt indices of ciphertext blocks Ci who
run from 0 to n − 1, in particular we stick to our more traditional convention
that C0 is the initialization vector (instead of y[n] in loc. cit.). We also allow to
stick to our convention where
−−−−→
CIPH ′ =
−−−−→
CIPH ·MatBastion is the transformed
ciphertext.
Proposition 1 (Under the following hypothesis, Bastion satisfies (n−2) CAKE
security). If the initialization vector C0 is sampled uniformly at random, then
for all (correctly generated) key K and for all possible tuples (s, t) of distinct
indices14 in (0, . . . , n− 1) then we have the following. Fix an index15 u distinct
from s, t then the random vector in (F2
|B|)n−2 defined by:
(9)
−−−−−−−→
PadBastion(s,t,u) =
(
BC(C0 + s) +BC(C0 + t) +BC(C0 + u), . . .
{BC(C0 + u) +BC(C0 + i)}i∈{0,n−1},i/∈{s,t,u}
)
(where one should read, instead of BC(C0 +0), just C0), is assumed to be indis-
tinguishable from a truly random vector of (F2
|B|)n−2 with independent uniform
components, for any polynomial adversary with access to BC and BC−1.
13As Katz-Lindell notice under their [19, definition 3.25], ”it is meaningless to say that BC
is pseudo-random if the key is known”.
14The two columns that A cannot see, which makes n(n+1)
2
possibilities depending on his
choice
15the pivot column: u = 2 in the 7× 7 example in the proof of appendix .2
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6.4 On the limits of the models of random oracle and ideal
blockcipher
The hypothesis of Proposition 1 could certainly hold in Shannon’s ideal block-
cipher model. This assumes that the blockcipher behaves such that, for every
key, a fresh random permutation oracle is created: see [6].
But, as for the random oracle, this model was shown to be unimplementable [21,
5]. More practically, Black [5, page 4] pointed that ”experts are reluctant to
model AES as ideal”, let alone on the 128 bits version, with a possibly badly
generated key. This doubt has become concrete very recently with new attacks
[24, 25, 8] distinguishing AES-based permutations from random ones.
7 Switching to sponge functions in Duplex mode
with shared header, for a faster scheme, under
the RPM assumption
The random permutation model (RPM) assumes a unique fixed random permu-
tation oracle. It seems thus less demanding than the previously discussed ideal
blockcipher model, in which the scheme 1 is casted, as well as Desai’s AONT
[15, Theorem 2]. Let us sketch a lighter alternative of SSAKE in the RPM.
Assuming the existence of a fixed random permutation f , the authors of
Keccak could prove the existence of a random oracle of arbitrary input and out-
put size in [3] (adopted for SHA3), as well as a variant: the encryption scheme
”SpongeWrap” which satisfies a strictly stronger property than indistinguisha-
bility between two chosen inputs (1). Namely, [4, Theorem 1] states that the
output of SpongeWrap is indifferentiable from the one of a random oracle, under
chosen inputs (similar to [15, Theorem 2] or our Hypothesis 1).
7.0.1 Security parameters
For mere privacy (not authentication) concerns, the security parameters of
SpongeWrap are |K| the length of the key and c the ”capacity” of the sponge.
The first formula of [4, Theorem 1] then states that for an adversary allowed
to do a negligible number of queries (N and q) with respect to 2c and 2|K|,
then the distinguishing advantage is essentially in max(2c, 2−|K|). For the sake
of comparison with an idealized AES 128, we thus took security parameters
|IV | = |K| = c = 128 (and bitrate r = 1600− c) for Keccak in our simulations
in 8.1. We set the number of rounds of the permutation f to 24, as recommended
by the guidelines16.
7.0.2 A faster (n− 1)-SAKE scheme
SpongeWrap essentially consists in giving as input, to a sponge function in Du-
plex mode, the concatenation (K|IV |−−−−−→PLAIN ), where IV is called the ”header”
and should be selected at random (or at least follow the ”nonce rule”). In par-
ticular, the key plays no specific role in the encryption except from not being
given to the adversary. Our insight is thus that, if the IV is not either given
16Note on Keccak parameters and usage, NIST hash forum, 2010
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to the adversary, then what we obtain is equivalent to SpongeWrap with key
(K|IV ): this essentially follows from the trivial [4, Lemma 3]. Thus even if
K is disclosed, the scheme is still indifferentiable from random with security
parameter |IV |. Our proposed SAKE scheme (call it ”Kecchare”) therefore
consists in secret sharing the IV , exactly as in SSAKE, and splitting directly
the ciphertext into arbitrary fragments without any further linear transform.
8 Comparison of SSAKE with Relevant Works
We compared the proposed SSAKE scheme with relevant works in terms of
amount of computations, share size, and security properties. Comparison results
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison with relevant works in terms of number of required block
cipher operations (block op.), number of required exclusive-ors, share size, and
two of the security properties.
Algorithm Block op. Exclusive-ors Share size Security (1) Security (2)
CTR Enc. c− 1 c− 1 |
−−−−→
CIPH|
n Yes No
SSMS c− 1 c− 1 + n |
−−−−→
CIPH|
n + |K| No (n− 1) SAKE 2
Rivest AONT 2(c− 1) 3(c− 1) |
−−−−→
CIPH|+|K|
n No (n− 1) SAKE 2
Desai AONT c− 1 2(c− 1) |
−−−−→
CIPH|+|K|
n No (n− 1) SAKE 2
Rivest AON 3c− 2 3(c− 1) |
−−−−→
CIPH|+|K|
n Yes (n− 1) SAKE
Desai AON 2c− 1 2(c− 1) |
−−−−→
CIPH|+|K|
n Yes (n− 1) SAKE
Bastion c− 1 3c− 1 |
−−−−→
CIPH|
n Yes (n− 1) SAKE
SSAKE c− 1 2c+ n |
−−−−→
CIPH|
n + |K| Yes 3 (n− 1) SAKE
Kecchare c− 1 n |
−−−−→
CIPH|
n + |K| Yes 3 (n− 1) SAKE
2 Scheme resistant to key exposure under the assumption that the encryption key stored
within the data was correctly generated.
3 The (n−1) SAKE property of SSAKE scheme holds under a lighter assumption than the
other schemes satisfying both Security (1) and (2).
8.1 Complexity and performance
As a baseline, we use CTR encryption that requires c − 1 block cipher oper-
ations and c − 1 exclusive-or operations. Rivest’s and Desai’s AON doubles
(Desai) or triples (Rivest, as the hash of data is computed) the number of block
ciphers operations in comparison to normal data encryption. Differently, Bas-
tion scheme applies only a linear transform over the encrypted data requiring
2c XORs. SSAKE applies only a linear transform (one pass of XORs) over the
ciphertext and an additive PSS over the IV (that has a negligible impact: n
xors, on the scheme performance when c is large). Both SSAKE and Bastion
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Figure 2: Performance comparison (in blue: schemes with both (1) and (2)
Security). Rivest’s, Desai’s, Bastion, and SSAKE scheme use AES-NI as the
underlying symmetric key encryption. The performance of the SSMS scheme is
essentially equal to the one of the pure data encryption (left)
require an additional pass of xors, used to add the counter in CTR mode of
encryption.
Results of an experimental evaluation are presented in Figure 2. SSAKE is
the fastest among schemes protecting encrypted data against key exposure based
on symmetric encryption with AES. Protection against key leakage is achieved
with an overhead of only 7% against a simple data encryption. The second
fastest scheme, Bastion, results in an overhead of around 19% in comparison
to data encryption. We believe that a fine-grained implementation of SSAKE
could make its overhead negligible.
We also add to the benchmark the performance results of our Keccak-based
”Kecchare” scheme —see 7 for description and security parameters— which we
implemented with Lake Keyak. Similarly to Bastion and SSAKE it requires
only one pass of encryption, and needs no linear transform except the one needed
to share the IV .
8.2 Share size
PSS outputs shares of size equal to the initial data and thus drastically increases
storage volume requirements. The rest of the scheme produce shares of size
close to |
−−−−→
CIPH|
n . The storage overhead of key size (SSMS and SSAKE) or of
|K|
n (Rivest’s and Desai’s schemes) per block may be neglected in the case of
storage of large data.
8.3 Security property (1): ind-CPA when all shares are
gathered
The ind-CPA property (property (1) from the Introduction) is not verified when
the encryption key is secret shared (SSMS) or ”hidden” (Rivest’s and Desai’s)
within the fragments. An attacker able to gather all the shares is then also able
to reconstruct the key and consequently to decrypt the data. Schemes in which
the key is managed by the user verifies the security property (1).
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8.4 Security property (2): SAKE
Simple encryption does obviously not verify the SAKE property. Rivest’s and
Desai’s AONT are SAKE in the sense that if the key was correctly generated
there is no way to acquire it apart of gathering all of the shares. However, the key
exposure due to, for instance, bad generation allows a partial decryption of the
ciphertext. Rivest’s and Desai’s AON verify the SAKE property as long as the
first key, the one used during the AONT, is never revealed (nor badly generated).
Bastion and SSAKE verifies the SAKE property. However, Bastion’s SAKE
property is verified under stronger security hypotheses (as was evidenced in
Section 6).
8.5 Implementation details
Relevant algorithms were implemented using the same programming style in
JAVA with JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540, X64-based PC running on Intel R©
CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with 8 GB RAM, under Windows 7. Stan-
dard javax.crypto library was used and the official Keccak implementation was
used for Lake Keyak 17. A random data sample was used for each measurement
and each presented result is an average of 30 measurements. AES-CTR-128 was
used as the algorithm for symmetric encryption. AES-NI was enabled. Results
are somewhat consistent with those presented in [18] when taking into account
the difference between AES and AES-NI (factor of 3 in performance) as well as
differences between hardware platforms.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we revisited computational secret sharing aiming at (1) protecting
data against an adversary possessing the shares but not the encryption key, and
(2) protecting data against an adversary possessing the encryption key and all
but one share. We introduced a new security model adapted to a real use case, in
which the privacy threat under key exposure is defined in terms of the number
of revealed shares and not, as so far in the AONT literature, the number of
revealed ciphertext blocks. We present a computational secret sharing scheme
- SSAKE - that verifies the security property (1) and (2) in this new model.
Complexity and empirical evaluations show that it performs faster than fastest
relevant scheme - Bastion - since the linear overhead is reduced by half. We
provide a detailed security analysis of not only the presented scheme but also of
previous relevant work. We formulate tight hypotheses under which the schemes
verify the security properties. We demonstrate that SSAKE requires weaker
hypotheses than Bastion. We also present a faster alternative scheme based on
Keccak in Duplex mode of encryption —instead of a block cipher encryption
using AES— which is secure in the random permutation model.
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.1 Non pseudorandomness of any two fragments of CTR
output when the key is public
Here we bound ourselves to look at the output of CTR from the point of view
of an adversary who has only two ciphertext blocks and the encryption key, and
show that it is not pseudo-random.
Consider an adversary A who chooses a plaintext P = [P1, . . . , Pn−1] and
whose goal is to distinguish between CTR encryption and a random function.
To make the challenge more difficult, suppose that the adversary is given only
two output blocks, of indices i and j (if one of them is zero, then the game
is even easier). Call Ci and Cj the corresponding output blocks given by the
oracle O to A. If C˜i and C˜j are true outputs of CTR, then we have
C˜i = Pi +BC(C1 + i)(10)
C˜j = Pj +BC(C1 + j)(11)
The winning strategy ofA is now clear: compute BC−1(C˜i−Pi)−BC−1(C˜i−Pi)
and compare with i−j: if equal then return ”CTR”, otherwise return ”random”.
.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us recall the matrix of the linear transform of Bastion, here for a
−−−−→
CIPH ′ of
size n = 7:
−−−−→
CIPH ′ =
−−−−→
CIPH ·

0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0

The last n − 2 columns are separated from the two first to illustrate the
view of an adversary who would always asks to see
−−−−→
CIPH ′A = (C
′
2, . . . , C
′
n−1)
during the Cake game. Performing elementary columns operations inside the
n− 2 columns of the adversary, like in the proof of SSAKE(6.1):
C”i≥3 := C ′i + C
′
2(12)
C”2 := C
′
2 +
∑
i≥3
C”i(13)
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we obtain view:
−−−−→
CIPH” =
−−−−→
CIPH ·

0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1

which is the equivalent to the former, from the point of view of an adversary
seeing only the last (n − 2) columns: −−−−→CIPH”A = (C”2, . . . , C”n−1). (Let us
repeat the argument of 6.1: from this new view one can deduce the former one,
so the guessing advantage of the adversary is larger —actually: equal— than
with the previous view). As in 6.1,
−−−−→
CIPH”A is equal to a value known to
the adversary (deduced from [0,
−−−−−→
PLAIN (0)] or [0,
−−−−−→
PLAIN (1)] by transforming
them according to the previous matrix), plus
−−−−−−−→
PadBastion(1,2,3) , which is assumed
indistinguishable from a random uniform vector. Finally, we must loop over all
the possible (n − 2) uples of columns among n that A chooses to see. So we
end up with asking for the n(n+ 1)/2 distinct indistinguishability assumptions
of vectors
−−−−−−−→
PadBastion(s,t,u) , as formulated in Proposition 1.
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